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Recent Developments

MOLE v. JUTTON:

A Patient Suing a Doctor for Medical Negligence Due to Lack of
Informed Consent Is Not Entitled to a Jury Instruction on
Battery when the Doctor Exceeds the Scope of Consent Given
By: April M. Urban
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a patient suing a
doctor for medical negligence due to lack of informed consent is not
entitled to a jury instruction on battery when the doctor exceeds the
scope of consent given. Mole v. lutton, 381 Md. 27, 846 A.2d 1035
(2004). In a case of first impression, the court concluded that a doctor
must deliberately intend to deviate from the consent given by the
patient in order for an action for battery to be sustained. ld. at 47, 846
A.2d at 1047.
Tasha Mole ("Mole") consulted a doctor after discovering a
painful lump in her breast. A sonogram revealed two cysts, one of
which contained a mural nodule that required a biopsy to rule out the
possibility of malignancy. On her doctor's advice, Mole consulted a
surgeon, Dr. Jutton, who attempted to aspirate the cyst; however, Dr.
Jutton was unable to complete the procedure because Mole's cyst was
too tender to aspirate with a needle. As a result, Dr. Jutton
recommended a surgical procedure to remove the nodule. Dr. Jutton
explained the risks involved including post-operative infection.
Mole signed a consent form which explained that unknown
conditions might be revealed during the procedure that could
necessitate either an extension of the original procedure or a different
procedure. Moreover, the consent form extended permission to Dr.
Jutton to render additional treatment as necessary or advisable in the
exercise of professional judgment. During the surgical procedure, Dr.
Jutton removed tissue surrounding the two cysts and cut Mole's milk
ducts.
Mole filed an action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County alleging medical negligence and battery. Her battery claim
was premised on the doctor having exceeded the scope of consent by
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cutting the milk ducts leading to Mole's left nipple. At trial, Mole
requested that the court issue a jury instruction on battery, but her
request was denied. The court did, however, provide instructions on
medical negligence and lack of informed consent. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Mole and awarded her $22,500.00.
Mole filed a timely appeal challenging the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury on battery. However, prior to a hearing in the
intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari on its own initiative to determine whether a patient
suing a doctor for lack of informed consent is entitled to a jury
instruction on battery when the doctor exceeds the scope of consent
given.
In order to determine whether a physician's operation
exceeding the scope of informed consent is battery, the court of
appeals began its analysis by reiterating its previous holding in Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). Mole, 381 Md. at 39, 846
A.2d at 1042. In Sard, the court held that a claim under the doctrine of
informed consent is correctly plead as a tort of negligence, not battery
or assault. ld. (citing Sard, 281 Md. at 434,379 A.2d at 1017).
The negligence-based doctrine of informed consent requires
physicians to disclose material risks and available alternatives so the
patient can make an informed decision about what should be done
with his or her body. ld. at 40, 846 A.2d at 1043. In Sard, the patient
sued her doctor after becoming pregnant following a bilateral tubal
ligation. ld. (citing Sard, 281 Md. at 435, 379 A.2d at 1017). Sard
alleged negligent performance of the procedure and lack of informed
consent for the doctor's failure to advise her that the procedure was
not absolutely certain to succeed. ld.
The court of appeals disagreed with Mole's argument that the
doctrine of informed consent, as set forth in Sard and subsequent
decisions, does not "rise to the level of stare decisis." Mole, 381 Md. at
40, 846 A.2d at 1043. In fact, the court reaffirmed that the doctrine of
informed consent as enumerated in Sard, was in fact a holding and
not dicta. ld. However, the court agreed with Mole that no Maryland
court has addressed the precise issue in the instant case-whether a
doctor who exceeds the scope of consent in a medical procedure is
committing battery. ld.
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In deciding this issue of first impression, the court looked to

the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Specifically, the court in Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp.2d 488 (D.
Md. 2001), addressed the same issue presented in the instant case.
Mole, 381 Md. at 44, 846 A.2d at 1045. Although not mandatory
authority, the court of appeals found Robinson persuasive and chose
to adopt the analysis and rationale from that case, rather than Sardo
Id. at 46, 846 A.2d at 1046. In essence, the court aligned itself with the
majority of courts that have addressed the issue in the instant case. Id.
In Robinson, a doctor performed a bilateral tubal ligation
during an emergency caesarean section without informed consent. Id.
at 44-45, 846 A.2d at 1045 (citing Robinson, 140 F.5upp.2d at 490).
Robinson sued her doctor, alleging lack of informed consent and
battery. Mole, 381 Md. at 45,846 A.2d at 1045. The district court held
that the "touching" of Robinson by her doctor was not battery
because no proof existed that the doctor acted by "intending to cause
a harmful or offensive contact." Id. (quoting Robinson, 140 F.Supp.2d
at 490). In fact, Robinson consented to the initial touching during the
emergency operation, which was not harmful because it did not cause
any additional physical pain, injury, or illness more than the pain
attributed to the original procedure. Mole, 381 Md. at 46, 846 A.2d at
1046. Most importantly, Robinson testified that she was not aware
that the procedure occurred until twenty one months after it
transpired. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that the procedure
did not offend Robinson's reasonable sense of dignity because she
had previously given birth to six children. Id. (citing Robinson, 140
F.Supp.2d at 493).
Furthermore, the court of appeals found significant the case of
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (1972). Mole, 381 Md. at 46, 846 A.2d at
1046. In Cobbs, the court held that the intentional tort of battery is
reserved for instances where either no consent is obtained, or the
patient consents to one treatment but a substantially different one is
performed. Id. at 47, 846 A.2d at 1046-47 (citing Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8).
Moreover, the intent to deviate from the consent given must be
deliberate, as opposed to merely failing to meet the duty of care to
disclose pertinent information. Mole, 381 Md. at 47, 846 A.2d at 1047
(citing Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8). In the latter case, the action should be
pleaded in negligence. Mole, 381 Md. at 47, 846 A.2d at 1047.
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Applying the findings in the previously mentioned cases to
the instant case, the court of appeals concluded that Dr. Jutton
inadequately disclosed the potential risks associated with the
procedure, namely, that the required incision may result in the cutting
of milk ducts. Mole, 381 Md. at 47, 846 A.2d at 1047. However, Mole
consented to the procedure that was performed and to any necessary
extension that the doctor deemed medically necessary. ld.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reasoned that the cutting of the milk
ducts was a necessary part of the expected procedure, thus it was not
unrelated or independent from the consent given. ld. Consequently,
the case was one of lack of informed consent, not battery. ld. As a
result, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling holding
that the denial of Mole's request for a jury instruction on battery was
proper and created no reversible error. ld.
The court's holding in Mole v. Jutton distinguishes between a
situation in which the patient alleges that there was no consent for the
touching, and one in which consent was not informed. In so holding,
the court's distinction ensures that patients are able to make informed
decisions about what happens to their bodies while protecting doctors
from rising insurance rates resulting from lawsuits. In particular,
unlike an informed consent case where the patient must show that the
injury involved a material risk that was not explained, an action for
battery does not require such expert testimony and is much easier to
prove. Thus, the court's distinction protects doctors and patients
alike from rising costs associated with medical malpractice litigation,
and also results in decreased medical fees for patients.
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